University of Rhode Island

DigitalCommons@URI
Environmental and Natural Resource
Economics Faculty Publications

Environmental and Natural Resource
Economics

9-2014

Partisan Sorting in the United States, 1972-2012: New Evidence
from a Dynamic Analysis
Corey Lang
University of Rhode Island, clang@uri.edu

Shanna Pearson-Merkowitz
URI, shannapm@gmail.com

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.uri.edu/enre_facpubs
Part of the American Politics Commons, Geography Commons, and the Models and Methods
Commons

The University of Rhode Island Faculty have made this article openly available.
Please let us know how Open Access to this research benefits you.
This is a pre-publication author manuscript of the final, published article.

Terms of Use
This article is made available under the terms and conditions applicable towards Open Access
Policy Articles, as set forth in our Terms of Use.
Citation/Publisher Attribution
Lang, C., & Pearson-Merkowitz, S. (2014). Partisan Sorting in the United States, 1972-2012: New Evidence
from a Dynamic Analysis. Political Geography, 48, 119-129.
Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2014.09.015

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Environmental and Natural Resource Economics at
DigitalCommons@URI. It has been accepted for inclusion in Environmental and Natural Resource Economics
Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@URI. For more information, please contact
digitalcommons@etal.uri.edu.

Forthcoming in Political Geography

Partisan Sorting in the United States, 1972-2012:
New Evidence from a Dynamic Analysis
Corey Lang
University of Rhode Island
clang@mail.uri.edu
and
Shanna Pearson-Merkowitz
University of Rhode Island
shannapm@gmail.com

September 2014

Abstract
Whether Americans have “sorted” into politically like-minded counties and to what
extent is hotly debated by academic and journalists. This paper examines whether or not
geographic sorting has occurred and why it has occurred using a novel, dynamic analysis.
Our findings indicate that geographic sorting is on the rise, but that it is a very recent
phenomenon. In the 1970s and 1980s, counties tended to become more competitive, but
by 1996 a pattern of partisan sorting had emerged and continued through the present.
Results suggest this pattern is driven by Southern re-alignment and voting behavior in
partisan stronghold counties. Lastly, we find evidence that migration can drive partisan
sorting, but only accounts for a small portion of the change.
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For the past two decades, the presidency and both houses of Congress have been
hotly contested by the two political parties in each election. Yet geographically, the
United States seems to be increasingly marked by one-party locales. “Red” areas where
the Democratic Party lacks any ability to compete for electoral spoils and “blue” areas
where the Republican Party lacks enough electoral support to even produce viable
candidates, appear by many accounts to be intensifying over time (Bishop 2008; Klinkner
and Hapanowitz 2005; Myers 2013; Walker 2013).
While geographic sorting has much media appeal, if, and to what extent, the
country has actually sorted is an open question. Several scholars have argued that
geographic sorting is a myth (Abrams and Fiorina 2012; Klinkner 2004; Glaser and Ward
2006) at the same time as others have argued it is increasing (Bishop 2008; Bishop and
Cushing 2004). What drives geographic sorting if it does exist is also an open debate
(Abrams and Fiorina 2012; Bishop and Cushing 2004; Myers 2013). Thus there remain
two empirical questions: has the country sorted into more geographically like-minded
locations? And, if so, why has this occurred?
Scholars have pointed to forces both internal and external to the political process.
On the one hand, some contend that an increase in geographic polarization is primarily
due to external forces: people are increasingly choosing their neighborhoods based on
criteria that correlate highly with political preferences (Tam Cho, Gimpel, and Hui 2013;
Bishop 2008). This argument rests on a gradual replacement mechanism: voters from the
1970s to the present have increasingly used partisan or lifestyle criteria as part of their
decision about where to live. Since only a small fragment of the population relocates
between each election, this process relies on a steady movement of people who gradually
sort to produce homogenous communities.
Other scholars posit that changes in the electoral make-up of the United States are
due to changes in the dynamics of the political parties. First a process of “secular
realignment” (e.g. Key 1959) has occurred and second, political party elites have made it
much easier for the electorate to understand which party they should vote for based on
pre-existing policy or ideological preferences, a process scholars label “partisan sorting”
(Levendusky 2009).
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The purpose of this paper is to shed new light on these questions using new
methodology and improved data. First we investigate changes in geographic polarization
over the last 30 years using county level presidential voting outcomes. Second, we
investigate the extent to which the change in geographic polarization is due to the
migratory patterns of the electorate.
Our findings indicate that the increase in geographic polarization across counties
is a much more recent phenomenon than is suggested by the extant literature and that it
has occurred during a time of heightened ideological purity on the part of the party elites.
Our results indicate that geographic polarization did not begin until after the 1996
election. In addition, we find that the increase in geographic partisan dispersion seems to
be due both to the residential mobility of voters as well as non-mobility related factors.
Our results also uncover a fascinating story in which nearly all of the action of
voting dynamics has happened in the tails of the political spectrum. This is consistent
with current notions of polarization: just as already politically extreme voters are
becoming more extreme in their views (Pew 2014), our results indicate that places that
are already marked by an apparent absence of members of the opposition party are
becoming even more politically homogenous. Moreover, we find interesting results
about the effect of migrants on political competition. We find that in-migration can both
increase and decrease geographic polarization even when controlling for demographic
factors. However, our results suggest that for most counties partisan sorting is a larger
driver of polarization than in-migration. We find no evidence that out-migration has a
meaningful impact on polarization.

Is the Country Sorting into More Likeminded Communities?
The desire for social harmony is so strong that people generally rule out talking
about sensitive topics that increase the likelihood of disagreement (Axelrod 1997;
Huckfeldt and Sprague 1993). Linus, in the 1966 television special of Charlie Brown,
perhaps said it best: "There are three things I have learned never to discuss with people:
religion, politics, and the Great Pumpkin." People prefer to be among those with whom
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they feel no pressure to restrain themselves from discussing their positions on such topics
(particularly the Great Pumpkin).
Homophily is a well-established social priority for most individuals (McPherson,
Smith-Lovin and Cook 2001). Humans seek out environments in which they feel not just
safe, but comfortable. And importantly, “the most basic source of homophily is space:
We are more likely to have contact with those who are closer to us in geographic location
than those who are distant” (McPherson, Smith-Lovin and Cook 2001, 429). Some
authors have argued that in this search for social homophily residents of the U.S are
migrating to more politically homogeneous locations. Bishop (2008) argues this using
data on presidential elections by county from 1974 and 2000 and in a separate analysis
1948-2000 (Bishop and Cushing 2004).
Indeed, since these analyses were performed, further evidence has suggested that
the country is becoming more geographically polarized (McKee and Teigen 2009; Myers
2013; Walker 2013). Between 2000 and 2004, Klinkner and Hapanoicz (2005) found
slight increases in political segregation, although it was not evident in the most strongly
partisan counties, indicating that those counties closer to the mean have started to diverge
politically. And Lesthaeghe and Neidert (2009) analyze the 2008 election, and find that
counties that favored one party in 2004 favored the same party in greater proportions in
2008. However, several scholars have challenged this research, asserting that geographic
polarization is a myth (Fiorina Abrams and Pope 2008; also see Ansolabehere, Rodden
and Snyder 2006; and Glaser and Ward 2006; Klinkner 2004). Fiorina and Abrams
(2012) analyzed party registration data and found “no evidence that a geographic partisan
‘big sort’ like that described by Bishop is ongoing” (p. 208). Thus, the extent of
geographic polarization is still in dispute. Assuming for the moment that the country has
been sorting itself into more politically homogenous locations, there is an additional open
question: how has this process occurred?

Two Potential Causes of Geographic Polarization
If geographic polarization has been on the rise, one possible mechanism for
increased levels of political homophily is voter migration. The movement of voters from
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diverse locations to areas of more political homophily, could arguably be the causal
mechanism creating the appearance of a “red and blue” America. Such a hypothesis is
supported by Robinson and Noriega’s (2010) study of the Rocky Mountain West.
Jurevich and Plane (2012) , using states as their unit of analysis, also show that the
partisanship of state electorates is a consequence of the in- and out-migration of
Republicans and Democrats. Likewise, Tam Cho, Gimpel and Hui (2013) find that
voters state that they take living among co-partisans into account in their housing choices
on opinion surveys (also see McDonald 2011) and Hawley (2014) finds that there “is a
relationship between a community’s political attributes and partisan’s willingness to
move there” (8). However, even if people are not making partisan choices per se in their
housing decisions, there could be partisan consequences as a result of moving since
partisanship correlates with things like tolerance for diversity and amenity preferences.
To be clear, for housing decisions to create geographic polarization, people need not
intentionally seek out places in which co-partisans live. People could make decisions
about where to live based on “lifestyle” criteria such as proximity to a locally owned
coffee shop or organic grocery, or the “walkability” of a neighborhood. But, as long as
lifestyle preferences correlate with political preferences, housing decisions can create
political polarization (Hawley 2014).
Equally plausible, however, is the argument that instead of migration based
geographic sorting, “partisan sorting” (Levundusky 2009) or “secular realignment” (Key
1959) has taken place. In contrast to geographic sorting models where voters move to
locations where people are more likeminded, a secular realignment/partisan sorting
hypothesis posits that voter mobility is unrelated to the fundamental causes of
polarization. Instead, two processes occur that create the appearance of an increasingly
geographically sorted electorate. First, the generational replacement following a partisan
realignment has resulted in the appearance of heterogeneity in places that are
ideologically homogeneous. For example, in the South, the Roosevelt administration’s
support of civil rights, the independent candidacy of Strom Thurmond in 1948, and the
subsequent passage of the Voting Rights Act in 1965 caused a critical partisan
realignment (e.g. Archer and Taylor 1981, 143-162; Webster 1992; Hood, Kidd, and
Morris 2012) : white southerners who were once reliably Democratic Voters today vote
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almost uniformly Republican. However, according to Green, Palmquist and Schickler
(2002) few southern Democrats shifted their party identification to the Republican Party.
Instead over time, generational replacement occurred where new voters identified with
the Republican Party as the older Democratic identifiers passed away. During the interim,
it appeared that there was partisan heterogeneity in locations that experienced no change
in the demographic or ideological make-up of its residents. For example, Webster (1992)
shows that in 1948, counties in Alabama stopped voting uniformly for Democratic
candidates, but it was not until 1968 that a majority of Alabama counties voted for the
Republican presidential nominee. In 1965, the Voting Rights Act caused the voting
population in Alabama to double. These new voters gained the franchise during a time of
party change. It took several generations for new voters to align their party identification
to their ideological views (Green et al 2002).
However, while much attention is paid to the partisan change that occurred in the
South, the membership of the two political parties across the country have changed in
ways that have produced far more ideological consistency. In the 1970s, scholars
bemoaned the apparent meaninglessness of the two political parties (e.g. Wattenburg
1998), but today the parties are polarized on all major issues (Thierault 2008). This
consistency among the political elite has made it much easier for new voters to choose a
party identification that aligns with their ideological positions (Abramowitz and Sanders
1998; Carsey and Layman 2006). Thus, one part of the sorting process is that
generational replacement has occurred so that places are now more geographically
homogeneous in response to realigning events and the increased ideological clarity of the
political elite. If this is the case, the appearance of politically heterogeneous counties
could have been a short-term phenomenon resulting from the realignment process.

Partisan Sorting or Geographic Sorting?
Although we do not argue that the mobility thesis is without merit, we find
realignment/partisan sorting theory to be the more theoretically rich explanation. While
race and the “culture wars” have been discussed at length for rationales of the public’s
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slow and steady move toward greater party loyalty and the heightened correlation
between ideology and party identification (Layman 2001), today, there are few issues that
do not clearly distinguish Republicans from Democrats, and as a result, the party labels
are more akin to “brand names” that encompass a range of policy positions (Aldrich
1995).
While both theories could easily produce the type of geographic polarization that
commentators have lamented, there are substantial reasons to posit that
realignment/partisan sorting theories are the more likely explanations. As Abrams and
Fiorina (2012) note, most people believe that they live in areas with a fair amount of
political heterogeneity; thus, if people are choosing their residential location based on a
preference for partisan homophily, they are, in their own opinion, not doing a good job.
Second, and more importantly, politics is not a common conversation topic in the United
States, except for when a high profile presidential election is taking place (Lazarsfeld et
al. 1944). Moreover, Americans historically are not very politically sophisticated
(Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes 1960). It, therefore, seems unlikely that
migrants, except a select few who are very interested in politics, would go through the
trouble to learn about the political characteristics of neighborhoods and make moving
decisions accordingly.
Although we find partisan sorting theory and the changes in party strategy to be
the more compelling explanation for geographic polarization, there is no reason that they
could not be occurring simultaneously or compounding one another. The ideological
clarity of the parties increases the ability of those who stay-put residentially to vote in
line with their preexisting values, just as, as a result of the increase in partisan
polarization, migrants may seek out places where they can express their socio-political
views without fear of rejection. Thus, it may also be that as partisan sorting has occurred,
people are more likely to seek out like minded places to live.
In the next section, we examine the timeline of geographic sorting and we test the
extent to which the movement of the electorate has led to a more geographically
polarized America.
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Hypotheses and research design
First, we must see if geographic polarization is on the rise. We posit that it is
likely that the country has begun to polarize geographically given the research to date.
However, given recent studies and our expectation that geographic polarization is at least
to some extent a product of the slow process of partisan sorting and secular realignment,
we expect the timeline for this polarization to be a quite recent phenomenon.
Second we test which theory better explains sorting. If voter migration theory is
correct, we should witness an increase in geographic polarization that happened gradually
over time and is correlated with the number of people who have moved. In this case,
voter mobility should increase geographic polarization across the entire timespan.
Partisan sorting theory on the other hand suggests that instead of a slow and steady
increase over three decades, the increase in geographic polarization may have begun in
the 1990s with the culmination of the realignment caused by first race and then religion
and culture (Carmines and Stimson 1989; Layman 2001).
Specifically, we expect the 1990s to be a “tipping point” due to the increased
ideological clarity of the parties that culminated in this period. The Republican
Revolution that corresponded with the “Contract with America” and the Christian
Coalition’s “Contract with the American Family” (Rozell and Wilcox 1995) was a
watershed moment for the ideological clarity of the Republican Party. No longer was the
Republican Party to be a “big tent”, instead various Republican-leaning groups began
requiring members to vote along party lines and sign a variety of “contracts” and
“pledges” (such as Grover Norquists “Taxpayer Protection Pledge”) that promised to
uphold a variety of conservative policy positions. Although few Americans were aware
of these documents, they changed the Republican elite’s operational calculus and ushered
in an era of forced ideological purity. Layman et al (2010) also find that it was in the
1990s that the level of polarization across issue positions on the part of political activists
and the mass public increased dramatically. Perhaps most importantly, it was 1996 when
Fox News was introduced to the country. DellaVigna and Kaplan (2007) found that the
emergence of the Fox News Channel in over 9,000 towns between 1996 and 2000
increased Republican vote share in the Presidential election by up to 0.7 percentage
points per town. Likewise, Hopkins and Ladd (2013) found that conservatives and
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Independents voted more heavily for the Republican candidate in towns in which Fox
News was first introduced and Clinton and Enamorado (2014) find that in areas in which
Fox News was rolled out, Congressional representatives became more conservative in
response. Thus, we expect an increase in geographic polarization in the late 1990s due to
the “Fox News effect.”
Clearly stated, we expect partisan geographic polarization to begin in the 1990s
due to the increase in elite cues about where people with different ideological views “fit”
in the two-party system. In the 2000s, we expect there to be a further increase in
geographic polarization as political elites continued to polarize (McCarthy, Poole and
Rosenthal 2006) and talk radio, the internet, and cable news outlets further polarized
political issues (Sobieraj and Berry 2011). Finally, the 2000s marked a turning point in
the technology used by the political parties and candidate campaigns to identify voters
and mobilize the “base” (Hillygus and Sheilds 2009; Magleby et al 2007), thus we expect
to see an increase in geographic polarization in the 1990s and 2000s due to the perfect
storm of partisan ideological clarity and campaign technological advancements. Thus, we
hypothesize that even accounting for the migration of voters there will be an additional
increase in geographic polarization that is not accounted for by voter mobility.
Our empirical specification examines how voting evolves dynamically for a given
initial starting point. We observe vote shares at the county level, c, for a presidential
election in every year t, 1972-2012. County voting data was gathered from David Leip’s
atlas of presidential elections, and we restrict our analysis to the Continental United
States. 1 The dependent variable in our model is the four-year change in Democratic
Party advantage (∆𝑑𝑎𝑐,𝑡 ) between two successive presidential elections (∆𝑑𝑎𝑐,𝑡 = 𝑑𝑎𝑖,𝑡 −

𝑑𝑎𝑖,𝑡−1). Democratic Party advantage equals the share of votes received by the

Democratic presidential nominee minus the share of votes received by the Republican
presidential nominee. Our key explanatory variable is the base-year Democratic
advantage in the county, 𝑑𝑎𝑐,𝑡−1. 2 Our basic empirical specification is:
1

David Liep’s data is available at: http://uselectionatlas.org/. Admittedly, using county level data
results increases measurement error. Perhaps the best way to test this hypothesis would be to use
neighborhood level data. However, this problem should bias our results away from finding
evidence in favor of our hypotheses.
2
We have included a portion of our data in the online appendix for reference.
9

∆𝑑𝑎𝑐,𝑡 = 𝛽𝑡−1 𝑑𝑎𝑐,𝑡−1 + 𝛿𝑡−1 + ∆𝜀𝑐,𝑡

(1)

Where 𝛿𝑡−1 is a year fixed effect and 𝜀𝑐,𝑡 is the error term. The year fixed effects control

for changes in the popularity of the parties and candidates between one election and the
next. For example, the 1972 election between Nixon and McGovern was a landslide,
whereas the 1976 election between Ford and Carter was close. Between these two

elections, our dependent variable will be positive for a vast majority of counties, but that
is due to the relative electability of the candidates, not anything inherent to sorting.
Abrams and Fiorina’s criticize using presidential voting as a measure of aggregate
partisanship. They argue that presidential voting is the result of short-term, candidaterelated factors and so cannot be used to assess geographic polarization. Our modelling
strategy accounts for this issue.
The coefficient of interest is 𝛽𝑡−1, which measures the relationship between

Democratic advantage in base year t-1 and the change in Democratic advantage between
t-1 and t. A positive 𝛽𝑡−1 would indicate that vote shares are becoming more dispersed
between election t-1 and t. On average, counties with a positive Democratic Party

advantage will see the Democratic advantage increase in the next election. In contrast,
counties with a negative Democratic advantage (and thus a Republican vote majority)
will see Democratic advantage decrease in the next election. Thus, a positive 𝛽𝑡−1

suggests an increase in geographic polarization. A negative 𝛽𝑡−1 can indicate two things.

First, it can indicate that voting patterns are reverting to the mean (e.g. becoming more
heterogeneous) between election t-1 and t. A county with a positive Democratic

advantage would be expected to have less of a Democratic advantage in the next election.
Reversion in this case, indicates that the county became more competitive. Second, a
negative 𝛽𝑡−1 can indicate party switching, in which case a county with a positive

Democratic advantage would be expected to have a negative Democratic advantage (i.e. a
majority voting for the Republican candidate) in the next election.
Our specification allows the effect of baseline ideology on changes in partisanship
(𝛽𝑡−1) to vary in every base election year, and this is fundamental to our research

question. We are investigating not only whether or not geographic polarization has
occurred, but how polarization dynamics have changed over time.
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To build intuition, we first present an example of the experience of several
counties. Figure 1 plots election results for four counties, each demonstrating a different
dynamic pattern. The x-axis in each graph is the Democratic advantage in vote shares,
deviated from the national average, which are the residuals from Equation (1). DeKalb
County has a Republican majority in 1972, but then a Democratic majority in 1976. This
would imply that 𝛽1972 is negative. The Democratic majority becomes slightly stronger

in 1980, which would imply 𝛽1976 is positive. The Democratic majority lessens (becomes
more heterogeneous), in 1984, which would imply 𝛽1980 is negative. Then the

Democratic majority steadily and consistently increases through 2012, implying 𝛽1984

through 𝛽2008 are positive. Howard County becomes more politically diverse between

1972 and 1976, switches parties between 1976 and 1980, becomes more heterogeneous
between 1980 and 1984, and then switches parties in four consecutive elections. Starting
in 2000, the county is reliably Democratic and becomes increasingly so in each election.
This trend would suggest that for Howard County 𝛽1972 through 𝛽1996 are negative and

𝛽2000 through 𝛽2008 are positive. Pasco County has a qualitatively similar dynamic path
to Howard County in that there are many years of party switching and reversion to the
national mean (negative 𝛽) followed by a stark shift toward one party (positive 𝛽). In
contrast, Woodbury County becomes more heterogeneous or switches parties every
election except one. DeKalb, Howard and Pasco all exhibit a dynamic pattern that
foreshadows our main results: early elections were marked by an increase in
heterogeneity or party switching, but later geographic sorting became the norm.
[Figure 1 about here]
To control for other factors influencing the four-year change in Democratic Party
advantage, we additionally include changes in other demographic variables, ∆𝑿𝑐,𝑡 , and

state by year fixed effects, 𝛿𝑐̅,𝑡−1, where 𝑐̅ indicates a collection of counties in the same
state:

∆𝑑𝑎𝑐,𝑡 = 𝛽𝑡−1 𝑑𝑎𝑐,𝑡−1 + ∆𝑿𝑐,𝑡 𝛾𝑡 + 𝛿𝑐̅,𝑡−1 + ∆𝜀𝑐,𝑡

(2)

Demographic controls include the log of average income, log of total population, percent
black, percent Hispanic, percent college graduate, percent over 65 years old, and percent
male. All controls were gathered from the decennial Census except income which was
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gathered from Bureau of Economic Analysis. 3 The full results of the models including
the controls can be found in the online appendix.
The coefficient on the vector of changes in demographic variables is subscripted by time,
to allow the influence of these variables to change over time. Again, state-year fixed effects act
to control for the relative popularity of candidates, but at a state level. We estimate Equation (2)
using weighted least squares, with weights equal to the total number of votes cast for each
county in the base-year. Since we are interested in voting behavior and changes therein, we
weight more heavily areas with more votes. 4
In order to investigate if geographic movement factors into voting dynamics, we
develop an extension of our model that examines how county level migration may drive
geographic polarization. For this analysis, we obtained migration data from the IRS. 5
This data provides a count of the number of people moving into and out of each county
and the number of people who have not moved. It is available for all U.S. counties for
Tax Filing Years 1990 through 2011 (e.g. Robinson and Noriega 2010). For each election
beginning with 1992, we first calculated the proportion of in- and out-migrants to nonmigrants for each county for each year. Second, we aggregated these numbers for the
four years preceding each election. Third, we calculated first-differences to get the
change in in- and out-migration between consecutive elections. 6 Finally, we estimated a
variation of Equation (2), which interacts in- and out-migration with Democratic
advantage, as well as controlling for in- and out-migration:
∆𝑑𝑎𝑐,𝑡 = 𝛽𝑡−1 𝑑𝑎𝑐,𝑡−1 + 𝜃𝑡−1 ∆𝑖𝑚𝑐,𝑡 + 𝜋𝑡−1 𝑑𝑎𝑐,𝑡−1 × ∆𝑖𝑚𝑐,𝑡

+𝜇𝑡−1 ∆𝑜𝑚𝑐,𝑡 + 𝜌𝑡−1 𝑑𝑎𝑐,𝑡−1 × ∆𝑜𝑚𝑐,𝑡 + ∆𝑿𝑐,𝑡 𝛾𝑡 + 𝛿𝑐̅,𝑡−1 + ∆𝜀𝑐,𝑡

3

(3)

For demographics generated from the census, linear interpolation between decade bookends
was used to get values for all intra-decade elections, i.e. 1972 values were imputed from 1970
and 1980 censuses. For example, if percent black was 10% in 1970 and 20% in 1980, then the
imputed value for 1972 would be 12% and the imputed value for 1976 would be 16%. For the
year 2012, we again used linear interpolation to extend the trend from 2000 to 2010 out two
more years. Due to changes in the census in 2010, education data was unavailable for that year.
For this year, we used the American Community Survey 5-year 2007-2011 estimates.
4
Without weights, our results are qualitatively identical, but there are some changes in
coefficient magnitudes and significance levels.
5
Available at: http://www.irs.gov/uac/SOI-Tax-Stats-Migration-Data
6
For the 1992 and 2012 elections, a full four years of migration are not available for the variable
construction; we see no reason that this will bias the result.
12

where ∆𝑖𝑚𝑐,𝑡 is the change in the proportion of in-migrants into county c between

election t and t-1 and ∆𝑜𝑚𝑐,𝑡 is the change in the proportion of out-migrants into county c
between election t and t-1. In Equation (3), 𝜃 (𝜇) measures the impact of increases or

decreases of in-migration (out-migration) rates on the change in Democratic advantage.
The parameters of interest, however, are 𝜋 and 𝜌, which examine how changes in in- and
out-migration, respectively, may affect changes in Democratic advantage differentially

depending on the base year partisanship of the county. A negative 𝜋 (𝜌) would indicate
that increased in-migration (out-migration) is a force of political heterogeneity, and a

positive 𝜋 (𝜌) would indicate that increased in-migration (out-migration) is leading to an

increase in polarization. In Equation (3), the total effect of baseline Democratic
advantage is now a function of in- and out-migration rates:
𝜕∆𝑑𝑎𝑐,𝑡

= 𝛽𝑡−1 + 𝜋𝑡−1 ∆𝑖𝑚𝑐,𝑡 + 𝜌𝑡−1 ∆𝑜𝑚𝑐,𝑡

𝜕𝑑𝑎𝑐,𝑡−1

(4).

We will use this Equation (4) to determine the relative importance of baseline sorting
compared to in- and out-migration.
Because the IRS data are available only from 1990, we supplement this analysis
using Decennial Census data 1970-2000. Due to the elimination of the long-form in the
Census in 2010, this variable is only available through the 2000 election. 7 From each
Decennial Census, we collect data on the percentage of the each county’s population that
moved into the county in the last five years. We then linearly interpolate this variable to
each election year and first-difference it to get ∆𝑖𝑚𝑐,𝑡 .
Results
This section presents our empirical results. It starts by discussing the results of estimating
Equation (2) on the entire set of counties in the continental United States. Then we examine if
and how the patterns of voting dynamics observed for the nation as a whole are different when
we split the sample by population density, partisan advantage and region.
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At least one of the reasons for the elimination of the long form was because the Census was
getting the same information from the American Community Survey. However, because ACS is
collected over five years, we do not get the same precision of data to match to other timereferenced data. The ACS also offers one year estimates, but these are noisy estimates given the
level of imputation.
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Table 1 presents our main results that examine the effects of Democratic advantage on
the change in Democratic advantage. Coefficients are initially negative and statistically
significant through base year 1984, then transition to insignificant in base years 1988 and 1992.
In base year 1996 the coefficients transition to being positive and significant and remain so
through base year 2008. These results suggest that in the 1970s and most of the 1980s, party
preferences tended to become more heterogeneous between elections. Then in the late 1980s and
early 1990s, voter preferences showed little change. Lastly, starting in 1996 and continuing
through the present, the voting dynamics shifted and voters’ preferences dispersed, leading to
increased geographic polarization.
[Table 1 about here]
While the pattern is clear, negative shifting to positive, we now consider the magnitude of
coefficients to explain the results more thoroughly. Consider the coefficient on base year 1972,
which is -0.136. This is interpreted as follows: a one percent increase in 1972 Democratic
advantage is associated with a .136 percent decrease in Democratic advantage in 1976. Suppose
a county votes 60% for the Democrat and 40% for the Republican, yielding a Democratic
advantage of 20. Our model predicts that on average this county will reduce its Democratic
advantage by 2.72% (=20*-0.136) and the vote split will be 58.64% for Democrats and 41.36%
for Republicans in 1976. Similarly, this coefficient suggests that a county with 60% of votes for
the Republican candidate in 1972 will vote 58.64% for Republicans. As the size of the
advantage grows, so does the change. A county with a Republican vote share of 70%
(Democratic advantage of -40) will experience a change double in magnitude to the county with
a vote share of 60% Republican and is predicted to have a 67.28% Republican vote share in
1976. In contrast, the model results predict that a county with a Republican vote share of 70% in
1996 will have a Republican vote share of 71.24% in 2000. Further, this will have a cumulative
effect as all coefficients after 1996 are positive. This example county will have Republican vote
shares of 72.13%, 72.55%, and 74.13% in 2004, 2008 and 2012, respectively.
In sum, Table 1 offers evidence of voting polarization, but only following 1996.
Following 1972, until 1984, we find consistent evidence that on average, counties became more
heterogeneous or switched parties following each election. However, there was a sharp change
following the 1996 election. After 1996, the results suggest that on average counties began to
polarize and this polarization increased in each election thereafter. Importantly, these results are
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found while controlling for socioeconomic and other demographic changes, which capture
homophily seeking behavior, and state-by-year fixed effects, which ensure that a single state or
region is not driving the results. Complete model output, including coefficients on demographic
variables, are available in the online appendix.

Voting dynamics split by population density
Table 2 presents an extension of Table 1 in which we examine the voting dynamics for
urban, suburban and rural counties separately. There has been some speculation that the
development of the suburbs and exurbs (e.g. Walks 2006) have been driving geographic political
polarization. We follow the USDA Urban-Rural Continuum codes to assign counties to one of
the three categories. Counties are defined as suburban if they are not urban but are proximate to
an urban county and are defined as rural if they are neither urban nor proximate to an urban
county. The results suggest voting evolved similarly across areas with differing population
density. In all cases, we see the general pattern that counties became more competitive in the
1970s and early 1980s and then in the more recent elections, became more politically
homogeneous. 8
[Table 2 about here]
One interesting difference is that the shift to polarization happens slightly earlier in urban
areas. For urban areas, the first positive and significant coefficient is for base year 1996 (0.08).
However, the coefficients in the suburban and rural areas for base year 1996 are both
insignificant. In base year 2000, suburban and rural areas have positive and significant
coefficients (0.06 and 0.02, respectively). The following base year, the rural coefficient increases
in magnitude to 0.07, which is in line with the magnitude seen in 1996 for urban areas and 2000
for suburban areas. Thus the results suggest that the polarizing trend spread from urban to rural
density areas with some time lag. In the most recent election, each of the three types of areas
showed homogenization of very similar magnitude.

Voting dynamics split by partisan dominance

8

We also examined models with counties divided purely by population density or total
population, instead of USDA’s classification; the results were similar.
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Table 3 presents a second extension of Table 1 in which we examine the voting dynamics
for counties that lean heavily toward a party and those that are highly competitive separately. We
partition county-year observations by base election year outcomes. Counties with a Democratic
advantage greater than 0.4 standard deviations above the mean for that year are labeled
Democratic. Counties with a Democratic advantage less than 0.4 standard deviations below the
mean vote share for that year are labeled Republican. The remaining counties are labeled
competitive. We chose 0.4 standard deviations to roughly split the population of counties into
thirds, while still allowing for an absolute standard, rather than relative party dominance. For
example, for base election year 2000, the ranges of Democratic advantage for the Republican
stronghold, competitive and Democratic stronghold, respectively, are [-86.2, -10.1], [-10.0,
11.0], and [11.2, 81.0]. For less competitive elections, these ranges shift one way or the other.
[Table 3 about here]
The results of Table 3 suggest that Democratic and Republican-leaning counties had
similar voting dynamics to each other and to the pattern observed in Table 1. For base years 1972
through 1992, coefficients are either negative and significant or insignificant, indicating that
when voting preferences changed, they became more heterogeneous. The pattern over this time
span is much stronger for Republican counties with all but one coefficient being statistically
significant, versus four of six being insignificant in the Democratic group. Starting in 1996 for
Democratic-leaning counties and 2000 for Republican-leaning counties, we see the coefficients
become positive and significant (except for 2004 in Democratic counties), indicating
polarization. Competitive counties do not show much of any trend. Consistent with overall
trends, competitive counties become more heterogeneous for base year 1972 and begin to
polarize for base year 2008. However, in the middle most coefficients are insignificant and the
coefficient for base year 1976 is positive and anomalously large.
Overall, these results uncover a fascinating story. Essentially, nearly all of the action of
voting dynamics has happened in the tails of the political spectrum. It is only in the most recent
election (2012) where we see significant polarization in counties we consider “competitive.”
This is consistent with current notions of polarization, that is, the tails are getting further from
moderate, or in this case, competitive. The remarkable finding is that in the 1970s and early
1980s, the tails were more likely to move towards becoming competitive and that shift towards
greater polarization is a recent development.
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Voting dynamics split by geographic region
Table 4 explores heterogeneity in voting dynamics by region of the country (East, South,
Midwest, and West) to see if the trends we observe vary by region. As explained above, there is
reason to believe that the South in specific could be driving the results due to the partisan
realignment of the southern states (e.g. Hood et al 2013; Archer and Taylor 1981). Overall, the
results suggest that each region of the U.S. followed a similar pattern of voting dynamics. For the
1970s and early 1980s, most coefficients are negative and significant matching the pattern of
increased political heterogeneity/party switching during this time. Then there is a period of stasis
followed in 1996 or 2000 by positive and significant coefficients. While the overall patterns are
similar, there are some differences. Notably, the West has a positive, significant coefficient in
base year 1980 and a negative and (barely) significant coefficient in base year 2004, both of
which run counter to the prevailing patterns. Also, in 2004, the coefficient in the Midwest is
negative and strongly significant. The East also has the least evidence of any change in partisan
sorting. Importantly, consistent with our expectations, the region that displays the most
consistent pattern of increasing heterogeneity/party switching to increasing homogeneity is the
South. While we do not find that the South is driving the results, the size of the coefficients in
the 1972-1988 period is the largest of any of the models and are all negative. In addition, the
South appears to polarize later than the rest of the country. The coefficient for 1996 is
insignificant, indicating that the shift toward greater political homogeneity did not begin until
following the 2000 election.
[Table 4 about here]
Indeed, these results suggest that while the entire pattern of geographic sorting was not
due to the realignment within the South,9 the Southern realignment may account for a substantial
portion of the observed increase in political heterogeneity in the early period. If the increase in
geographic sorting within the South is due to partisan realignment and generational replacement,
then the story told by Bishop and others about the process driving geographic polarization is
neither as dire nor as phenomenal as they indicate.

9

Estimating the model excluding the South results in only a few substantive changes to the
model. The baseline 1980 coefficient becomes positive but is not statistically significant. The
baseline 2004 coefficient becomes negative and is statistically significant at p<.01.
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Can voter migration explain voting dynamics?
At this point, we have not investigated why the country began to sort during these
years. While there are several possible explanations for the observed patterns in
dynamics, our unique data and methodology give us the ability to test the theory that the
mobility patterns of voters increased geographic polarization. Here we test how much of
the change in Democratic advantage is due to voter mobility (e.g. the extent to which
migration into/out of a county is the driver of geographic polarization). In these models
we include residential turnover data that measures the percent of the population that has
moved into the county between elections. Table 5 presents an analysis for years 19722000 that uses Decennial Census data to measure population turnover. Table 6 presents
similar models as estimated in Table 5, but for the years 1992-2012 using the IRS
migration data. Each of these models includes demographic controls and state by year
fixed effects. Again, the results of the control variables are available in the online
appendix.
[Table 5 about here]
Table 5 presents the results estimating Equation (3), modified to only include measures of
in-migration, which is available in the Census. Table 5, Model 1 is the basic model with no
migration data restricted to 2000 and before. This model is simply a replication of the results in
Table 1 but with the data ending in 2000. The second model in Table 5 includes a control for the
change of in-migration to counties, which is omitted to save space, and an interaction term
between Democratic Party advantage and change in in-migration. This model directly tests the
mobility hypothesis. A positive coefficient on this interaction term would indicate that as inmigration to a county increases, counties become more partisan. The results do not provide
support for this hypothesis. Instead, most of the coefficients are insignificant and the two
coefficients that are significant (1984 and 1988) are negative which indicates that more inmigration in these periods resulted in less geographic polarization in the following election.
Table 6 presents a similar analysis using IRS data, which include both in- and outmigration. While we and many others believe migration may play an important role in driving
partisan sorting, it is unclear whether in- or out-migration are equally important or in which
direction the effect should be. In-migration could lead to two different scenarios. When in-
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migration is due to homogeneity seeking behavior, in-migration should lead to an increase in
polarization, however, if in-migration is due to factors not correlated with partisanship such as
job-seeking behavior, in-migration might lead to greater heterogeneity. In short, people coming
into a county may bring new ideas or decide to settle there because of the politics of current
residents. But one could also imagine people leaving if local politics are shifting against their
preferences or because the area offers no job opportunities. As Gimpel (2010) notes, outmigration can have the effect of creating one party locals if the people “left behind” are
predominantly members of a single party. An important contribution of employing the IRS data
is being able to simultaneously and empirically test these ideas.
Again, Model 1 of Table 6 replicates the model in Table 1 limited to the years in which
the IRS filing data are available. Model 2 includes a control for change in in-migration and
change in in-migration interacted with Democratic advantage. Model 3 adds a control for change
in out-migration and change in out-migration interacted with Democratic advantage. It is
Models 2 and 3 that directly tests the mobility hypothesis, and Model 2 serves mostly to see how
the coefficients on in-migration change when out-migration is added to the model.
[Table 6 about here]
The results of Table 6 paint a very different picture than those of Table 5. In both
columns 2 and 3, all of the coefficients on the in-migration interaction are statistically
significant, suggesting that in-migration does indeed impact voting dynamics. Further, even base
years 1992 and 1996, which were insignificant in Table 5, are significant here which indicates
that the greater precision of the IRS data may lead to more precise estimates. Interestingly there
is not a consistent pattern to the interaction coefficients. Two coefficients (1992 and 2000) are
negative suggesting that voters entering a county increased partisan heterogeneity. In base years
1996, 2004 and 2008, the coefficients are positive indicating that in-migration increases
polarization in these years. We see these results as evidence that in-migration can be a force for
changing polarization, both increasing and decreasing it. However, in recent years, the results
suggest that in-migration primarily has been a driver of increased polarization, even when
controlling for demographic factors.
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In contrast, the results suggest that out-migration does not have the same influence on
polarization that in-migration does. Only one of the five coefficients on the out-migration
interaction terms is significant. While this one coefficient is positive, indicating out-migration
increased polarization in 2000, it is difficult to draw too many conclusions given the
inconsistency.
While the focus of Table 6 is in- and out-migration, it is important to note that the
coefficients on Democratic advantage remain quite similar across the three specifications.
Despite controlling for in- and out-migration and interacting these terms with Democratic
advantage, the base year coefficients remain large and statistically significant, indicating that
above and beyond voter migration, counties became more politically homogeneous between
1996 and 2000, 2000 and 2004, and 2008 and 2012. Only the coefficient for base year 2004 loses
statistical significance with the introduction of the interaction term.
While the sign of the critical interaction terms are fairly intuitive, it is important to
understand the magnitudes in order to gauge the relative importance of migration compared to
baseline sorting. For this we return to Equation (4). Plugging in the appropriate coefficients from
Table 6 into Equation (4) and omitting the out-migration interaction due to its insignificance, for
𝜕∆𝑑𝑎𝑐,𝑡

1996 we get 𝜕𝑑𝑎

𝑐,𝑡−1

= 0.059 + 0.058 ∗ ∆𝑖𝑚𝑐,𝑡 . When the change in in-migration is 1%, baseline

sorting and in-migration will be approximately equal forces for polarization. For a county with

Democratic advantage equal to 20 in 1996, these results predict Democratic advantage would be
21.18 in 2000 with no change in in-migration and 22.34 with a 1% change in in-migration. In
actuality, the change in in-migration tends to be less than 1%; the 95th percentile of the
distribution in 1996 is 0.98% and the 75th percentile is 0.19%. This means that for most counties,
baseline sorting is a greater driver of polarization than in-migration. For baseline 2008, Equation
𝜕∆𝑑𝑎𝑐,𝑡

(4) becomes 𝜕𝑑𝑎

𝑐,𝑡−1

= 0.080 + 0.021 ∗ ∆𝑖𝑚𝑐,𝑡 . For a county with Democratic advantage equal

to 20 in 2008, these results predict Democratic advantage would be 21.60 in 2012 with no

change in in-migration and 22.02 with a 1% change in in-migration. Again, these results are
suggesting that baseline sorting is a larger driver than in-migration. Further, in-migration
changes between 2008 and 2012 are small: the 95th percentile of the distribution in 2008 is
0.80%. However, in 2004, in-migration is a larger driver of sorting than baseline shifts alone.
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Given the importance of the region-specific results in Table 4 in shaping our
understanding of the South’s role in the voting dynamics observed, we also tested the findings in
Table 6 to see if they were driven by regional dynamics. We split the models between southern
counties and non-southern counties to see if the realignment in the south and the in- and outmigration the South has experienced is driving our results. We present these results in Table 7.
The coefficients on the in-migration interaction terms are the same sign for Southern and nonSouthern counties in all base years, though only three of the five coefficients in the South are
statistically significant. Only in base year 2004 is the interaction coefficient positive and
significant. These results indicate that in the South, the majority of the increase in geographic
polarization was not due to the migratory patterns of voters. This lends support for secular
realignment and partisan sorting theories. The non-Southern counties mirror the national results
presented in Table 5.
[Table 7 about here]

Conclusion
In this paper we first tested the question of whether the country has become more
geographically polarized over time using a dynamic analysis. Second, we explore several
possible causes of the partisan sorting patterns we observe, including Southern
realignment and migration.
We find evidence that the country has begun to “sort” into more polarized
counties. However, we do not find evidence that the timeline of geographic sorting fits
existing accounts. Instead we find evidence that until 1988 counties that swung for one
party over another either became more heterogeneous or switched parties in the following
election. However, following the 1996 election, something changed. With each election,
counties, on average, became more homogeneous. Our results therefore suggest that
partisan realignment coupled with the rancor with which the two parties have treated each
other for the last 20 years (e.g. Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1997), the advent of partisan
cable news, and the 1994 “Republican Revolution,” have led to an increase in geographic
polarization between 1996-2012. This is a normatively undesirable situation. Our results
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show that the nation saw a larger magnitude of geographic polarization between 2008 and
2012 than at any time since 1972. As a result, not only are partisans becoming
increasingly distant in their approaches to policy, they are also becoming increasingly
less likely to come into contact with one another. As such, our results may contribute an
explanation for why voters are becoming so disdainful toward the opposition party. The
Pew Research Center (2014, 5) reported that partisan animosity in the American
electorate has “more than doubled since 1994.” Research has shown that experience with
people who are politically different from oneself increases inter-group understanding
(e.g. Mutz 2006). Since our results show that during this same time period, voters have
been increasingly unlikely to come into contact with the other party within their county of
residence, particularly in highly partisan counties, our results may explain some of the
increase in partisan animosity.
On the matter of the process that led to this geographic polarization, we tested to
see if voter mobility accounted for the increase in country partisanship witnessed after
1996. Our results indicate that the increase in geographic polarization witnessed after
1996 was in part due to the migratory patterns of voters. We find evidence that
particularly outside the South, migration across counties was statistically correlated with
a decrease in political heterogeneity in the following election. However, inside the South,
we primarily find evidence that geographic polarization was not a result of in-migration.
Our analysis is in many ways a particularly difficult hurdle for the geographic
polarization thesis to cross since we examine whether it is occurring even after
sociodemographic characteristics have been taken into account. To be clear, we do not
propose that people are necessarily intentionally picking their neighborhood based on the
known partisan make-up of the residents. People may be choosing their neighborhood
based solely on lifestyle choices, but these lifestyle choices are so correlated with
partisanship that they have political consequences.
Thus we conclude by finding limited support for Bishop’s “Big Sort” thesis. The
migration of voters has increased the rate at which counties have become more politically
homogenous, but the majority of the change, according to our models has not been
caused by migration across county lines.
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Notes: The y-axis in each graph is the Democratic advantage in vote shares, deviated from the national average. For
example, DeKalb County had a Democratic advantage of 57.4% in 2012, and the nation as a whole had a
Democratic advantage of 3.8%. The difference of 53.6% is what is plotted for the last point in the DeKalb graph.
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Table 1: The Impact of Baseline Ideology on Partisan Sorting
Dependent variable = Δ Democratic advantage
between base year and four years later
Democratic advantage in year:
1972^

-0.136
(0.023)***
-0.092
(0.022)***
-0.040
(0.024)*
-0.046
(0.008)***
-0.002
(0.011)
-0.017
(0.014)
0.062
(0.011)***
0.042
(0.010)***
0.019
(0.008)**
0.070
(0.007)***

1976
1980
1984
1988
1992
1996
2000
2004
2008

Observations
R-squared

30518
0.863

Notes: Democratic advantage equals the share of votes received by the Democratic
presidential candidate minus the share of votes received by the Republican candidate. The
coefficient estimates come from Equation 2, which includes demographic controls and
state by year fixed effects. Demographic controls include share of population over 65,
share of population with college degree, share of population male, share of population
black, share of population Hispanic, log total population, and log average income.
Demographic controls are first-differenced and interacted with year fixed effects to allow
the effect of demographic variables to change over time. Weighted least squares is used
with weights equal to total votes cast in each county-year observation. Standard errors are
shown in parentheses and are estimated using the Eicker-White formula to correct for
heteroskedasticity and are clustered at the county level. *, **, and *** indicate
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
^Coefficient represents the effect of Democratic advantage in 1972 on the change in
Democratic advantage from 1972-1976, just as the coefficient for 2008 represents the
effect of Democratic advantage in 2008 on the change in Democratic advantage from
2008-2012.
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Table 2: The Impact of Baseline Partisanship on Partisan Sorting by Population Density
Dependent variable = Δ Democratic advantage
Urban
Suburban
Rural
between base year and four years later
Democratic advantage in year:
1972
-0.110
-0.204
-0.210
(0.023)***
(0.023)***
(0.024)***
1976
-0.096
-0.081
-0.082
(0.027)***
(0.019)***
(0.023)***
1980
-0.035
-0.057
-0.045
(0.028)
(0.022)***
(0.019)**
1984
-0.037
-0.069
-0.066
(0.009)***
(0.009)***
(0.010)***
1988
-0.000
-0.018
0.004
(0.014)
(0.011)
(0.013)
1992
-0.009
-0.071
-0.030
(0.017)
(0.013)***
(0.013)**
1996
0.077
-0.010
-0.002
(0.013)***
(0.013)
(0.013)
2000
0.041
0.064
0.021
(0.012)***
(0.011)***
(0.010)**
2004
0.004
0.069
0.066
(0.010)
(0.011)***
(0.012)***
2008
0.067
0.081
0.081
(0.008)***
(0.007)***
(0.008)***
Notes: All coefficients shown come from a single regression, and the sample size is 30518. Specification includes state by year fixed effects and
socioeconomic controls. Baseline year is interacted with dummy variables for Urban, Suburban and Rural, and it is these variables whose coefficients
are shown in the three columns of this table. Urban, Suburban and Rural county delineations come from USDA's Rural-Urban Continuum Codes.
Weighted least squares is used with weights equal to total votes cast in each county-year observation. The R-squared is 0.86. See Table 1 for more
details.
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Table 3: The Impact of Baseline Partisanship on Partisan Sorting by Party Advantage
Dependent variable = Δ Democratic advantage
Democratic Party
Republican Party
Competitive
between base year and four years later
Strongholds
Strongholds
Democratic vote share in year:
1972
-0.076
-0.094
-0.144
(0.062)
(0.035)***
(0.021)***
1976
-0.084
0.517
-0.144
(0.037)**
(0.167)***
(0.043)***
1980
0.011
-0.011
-0.068
(0.059)
(0.064)
(0.031)**
1984
-0.109
-0.024
-0.027
(0.025)***
(0.023)
(0.009)***
1988
-0.041
0.036
0.023
(0.027)
(0.056)
(0.017)
1992
0.004
-0.013
-0.058
(0.024)
(0.049)
(0.019)***
1996
0.095
0.062
-0.014
(0.015)***
(0.036)*
(0.016)
2000
0.052
0.040
0.029
(0.018)***
(0.052)
(0.014)**
2004
-0.006
-0.049
0.050
(0.014)
(0.047)
(0.013)***
2008
0.085
0.128
0.044
(0.011)***
(0.046)***
(0.008)***
Notes: All coefficients shown come from a single regression, and the sample size is 30518. Specification includes state by year fixed effects and
socioeconomic controls. Weighted least squares is used with weights equal to total votes cast in each county-year observation. The R-squared is
0.87. For each year in the sample, counties are divided between liberal, moderate, and conservative based on where they fall in the distribution
of vote shares. Counties with Democratic vote shares greater than 0.4 standard deviations above the mean vote share for that year are labeled
Democratic Party Stronghold. Counties with Democratic vote shares less than 0.4 standard deviations below the mean vote share for that year
are labeled Republican Party Stronghold. The remaining counties are labeled Competitive. 0.4 standard deviations was chosen to roughly split
the population of counties into thirds, while still allowing for an absolute standard, rather than relative, of party strength. See Table 1 for more
details.
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Table 4: The Impact of Baseline Ideology on Partisan Sorting by Region
Dependent variable = Δ Democratic advantage between
base year and four years later
Democratic advantage in year:
1972
1976
1980
1984
1988
1992
1996
2000
2004
2008

East

South

Midwest

West

-0.025
(0.043)
-0.171
(0.055)***
0.076
(0.046)*
-0.047
(0.015)***
-0.050
(0.031)
-0.033
(0.045)
0.113
(0.026)***
0.001
(0.020)
0.009
(0.017)
0.093
(0.023)***

-0.294
(0.033)***
-0.068
(0.027)**
-0.148
(0.022)***
-0.038
(0.011)***
-0.010
(0.014)
-0.019
(0.013)
0.022
(0.018)
0.051
(0.016)***
0.092
(0.018)***
0.055
(0.008)***

-0.113
(0.040)***
-0.071
(0.045)
-0.069
(0.041)*
-0.080
(0.016)***
0.014
(0.018)
-0.048
(0.025)*
0.041
(0.013)***
0.045
(0.012)***
-0.033
(0.010)***
0.099
(0.008)***

-0.111
(0.041)***
-0.016
(0.050)
0.083
(0.038)**
0.008
(0.022)
0.057
(0.030)*
0.049
(0.031)
0.091
(0.032)***
0.071
(0.027)***
-0.021
(0.012)*
0.053
(0.013)***

Notes: All coefficients shown come from a single regression with region dummy variables interacted with Democratic advantage. The sample size is
30518. Specification includes state by year fixed effects and demographic controls. Weighted least squares is used with weights equal to total votes
cast in each county-year observation. The R-squared is 0.87. See Table 1 for more details.
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Table 5: Voting Dynamics and Population Turnover, 1972-2000
Dependent variable = Δ Democratic advantage
between base year and four years later
Democratic advantage in year:
1972
1976
1980
1984
1988
1992
1996

(1)

(2)

-0.136
(0.023)***
-0.092
(0.022)***
-0.040
(0.024)*
-0.046
(0.008)***
-0.002
(0.011)
-0.017
(0.014)
0.062
(0.011)***

-0.129
(0.024)***
-0.096
(0.025)***
-0.032
(0.024)
-0.043
(0.008)***
-0.006
(0.012)
-0.018
(0.014)
0.067
(0.011)***

Democratic advantage X Δ share new county residents in year:
1972

-0.011
(0.009)
1976
0.002
(0.008)
1980
-0.003
(0.009)
1984
-0.013
(0.004)***
1988
-0.027
(0.008)***
1992
0.009
(0.008)
1996
0.007
(0.006)
Notes: Each column represents a separate regression with state by year fixed
effects and demographic controls. Column 1 replicates the results in Table 1.
Column 2 presents results from a specification that additionally includes change
in share of new county residents as a control as well as interacted with
Democratic advantage. Share of new county residents comes from Decennial
Census. See Table 1 and text for more details.
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Table 6: Voting Dynamics and Population Turnover, 1992-2012
Dependent variable = Δ Democratic advantage
between base year and four years later
Democratic advantage in year:
1992
1996
2000
2004
2008

(1)

(2)

(3)

-0.017
(0.014)
0.062
(0.011)***
0.042
(0.010)***
0.019
(0.008)**
0.070
(0.007)***

0.009
(0.019)
0.059
(0.010)***
0.038
(0.010)***
0.012
(0.008)
0.081
(0.008)***

0.008
(0.019)
0.059
(0.010)***
0.037
(0.009)***
0.011
(0.009)
0.080
(0.007)***

-0.030
(0.009)***
0.050
(0.009)***
-0.029
(0.011)**
0.024
(0.003)***
0.019
(0.005)***

-0.030
(0.009)***
0.058
(0.010)***
-0.028
(0.010)***
0.033
(0.011)***
0.021
(0.005)***

Democratic advantage X Δ share new county in-migrants in year:
1992
1996
2000
2004
2008

Democratic advantage X Δ share new county out-migrants in year:
1992

-0.024
(0.016)
1996
-0.024
(0.016)
2000
0.039
(0.013)***
2004
-0.004
(0.004)
2008
-0.001
(0.001)
Notes: Each column represents a separate regression with state by year fixed effects and
demographic controls. Column 1 replicates the results in Table 1. Column 2 presents results from a
specification that additionally includes change in share of new in-migrants as a control as well as
interacted with Democratic advantage. Column 3 presents results from a specification that
additionally includes change in share of new out-migrants as a control as well as interacted with
Democratic advantage. County in- and out-migrant data come from IRS migration data. See Table
1 and text for more details.
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Table 7: Voting Dynamics and Population Turnover, 1992-2012, for Southern and
Non-Southern Counties
Dependent variable = Δ Democratic advantage between base
year and four years later

South

Non-South

0.063
(0.035)*
0.058
(0.036)
0.059
(0.026)**
0.098
(0.024)***
0.067
(0.012)***

0.002
(0.021)
0.051
(0.010)***
0.033
(0.010)***
-0.011
(0.008)
0.084
(0.012)***

Democratic advantage X Δ share new county in-migrants in year:
1992
-0.034
(0.015)**
1996
0.019
(0.023)
2000
-0.047
(0.022)**
2004
0.087
(0.027)***
2008
0.003
(0.008)

-0.039
(0.011)***
0.061
(0.011)***
-0.028
(0.013)**
0.026
(0.009)***
0.034
(0.006)***

Democratic advantage in year:
1992
1996
2000
2004
2008

Democratic advantage X Δ share new county out-migrants in year:
1992
-0.018
-0.014
(0.032)
(0.020)
1996
0.008
-0.027
(0.029)
(0.017)
2000
0.062
0.047
(0.040)
(0.014)***
2004
-0.027
0.007
(0.010)***
(0.007)
2008
0.002
-0.004
(0.001)
(0.013)
Notes: Each column represents a separate regression with the same specification as
Column 3 of Table 6. See Table 6 and text for more details.
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